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Abstract 
Our results summarised in this policy brief  show that in order to solve the UK’s inequality, 
ecological sustainability and productivity problems, investing in care and green economy and taxing 
wealth to fund this investment offers a viable policy package. We present a policy mix of social and 
physical public investment, increasing wages of women and men with closing the gender gaps via upward 
convergence, and progressive income and wealth taxation. In particular we analyse the effects of a 1%-
point increase in public social spending in education, childcare, health and social care, which we refer to 
as 'purple social infrastructure',  and physical investment as a ratio to GDP, a 2% increase in female 
hourly wage rate, a 1% increase in male wage rate, a 1%-point increase in the tax rate on wealth, a 1%-
point increase in the tax rate on profit income, and a 1%-point decrease in the tax rate on wage income. 
As a result of this policy, we estimate that in the medium-run, GDP increases by 10.9%, women’s 
employment increases by 9.6%, men’s employment increases by 5.8%, and public debt/GDP decreases by 
10.3%-point.  
The positive impact of a 1%-point increase in public social investment in education, childcare, 
health and social care on both output (by 2.7% in the medium-run) and employment is substantial, and 
despite a strong positive effect on productivity, employment of both women and men increase (by 3.2% 
and 0.4% in the medium-run). A 1%-point increase in public social investment increases productivity 
(output per hour) in the rest of the economy by 3.3% percent, which provides supporting evidence that 
this spending functions as infrastructure investment, as it has long term benefits for the society as a 
whole, and it improves gender equality by socializing the unpaid invisible domestic labour of women. 
The increase in productivity is substantially higher in the case of public “purple” social infrastructure 
investment (3.3%) compared to the case of public physical infrastructure investment (0.5%). 
An upward convergence in wages, i.e. increasing wages of both men and women with closing 
gender pay gap leads to higher GDP in both the short and the medium-run. In that sense, output in the UK 
is both wage-led and gender equality-led, and hence equality-led. Labour market policies such as an 
increase in the minimum wage or collective bargaining coverage, while at the same time enforcing equal 
pay legislation and aiming at higher rates of increases in occupations at the bottom end of the pay scale, 
where women constitute a large share of the workforce, are expected to have a positive effect on GDP. In 
the medium-run higher wages also lead to higher productivity. However as the effect on productivity is 
stronger than on output, employment may fall in the medium run, unless there is a further demand 
stimulus. Hence, achieving both higher wages and gender equality and employment for both men and 
women requires a further stimulus to demand, and an adequate mix of public investment in social and 
physical infrastructure can achieve equality, ecological sustainability and productivity at once. 
A policy mix of only upward convergence in wages and public social infrastructure investment, 
i.e. higher more teachers, nurses, social care workers and pay higher hourly wage rates, has a strong 
positive impact on output and women’s employment, but men’s employment decreases in the medium-
run due to strong productivity gains.  Public debt/GDP falls as an outcome of this policy mix.  
A policy mix of upward convergence in wages and public investment in both social and physical 
infrastructure leads to a higher increase in output, and employment of both men and women increase both 
in the short and the medium-run. However, public debt/GDP increases marginally in the medium-run in 
this policy mix, and an increase in tax rates is required to improve public debt/GDP. But increasing public 
spending funds about half of itself by generating higher output and tax revenues. It is also worth 
emphasizing that private investment increases both in the short and medium-run, despite the partial 
negative effect of higher government borrowing thanks to the positive demand and productivity effects.  
An increase in the progressivity of income taxation in the form of increasing tax rate on capital 
income and decreasing tax rate on labour income increases output, private investment, men’s and 
women’s employment, and decreases public debt/GDP in both the short and the medium-run. An increase 
in the tax rate on wealth decreases wealth concentration, and has a positive and very strong impact on 
output, private investment, employment and the budget balance. The results indicate that taxation of 
wealth is a particularly effective policy to fund purple and green public investment; e.g. inheritance tax 
may be a suitable tool for funding long term elderly care. 
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A policy mix for equitable sustainable development in the UK: 
The effects of gender equality, wages, wealth concentration and fiscal policy 
1. Introduction 
Our recent research presents the macroeconomic effects of a policy mix of upward 
convergence in wages, i.e. increasing wages for both women and men with closing gender pay 
gap, public investment in both purple social infrastructure in health, social care, education and 
child care, and green physical infrastructure, and progressive taxation with increasing taxes on 
capital income and wealth and decreasing taxes on labour income (Onaran, Oyvat and 
Fotopoulou, 2019). We analyse the effects of alternative policies on GDP, hours of employment 
of women and men, productivity (output per hour) and their implications for the ratio of public 
debt to GDP. 
A distinctive feature of the last four decades has been a rise in multiple dimensions of 
inequality in the UK  -a trend common in many developed and developing countries. There has 
been a sharp polarization of personal income distribution as well as a significant change in 
functional income distribution, i.e. a fall in the share of labour income in national income. There 
has been also a remarkable increase in wealth concentration. Figure 1 in the Appendix shows the 
functional income distribution, i.e. the share of wages in national income (labour 
compensation/GDP at factor cost, adjusted for the labour compensation for each self-employed 
equivalent to the average compensation of the dependent employees) and wealth concentration 
(share of the top 1% in total net wealth) in the UK. The share of wages in GDP fell from its peak 
of 0.706 to 0.584 in 1996 and despite a recovery since then, it is 4%-point below its peak at 
0.665 as of 2016. Wealth concentration, measured by the share of the top 1% in total net wealth, 
has fallen from 0.283 in 1972 to 0.152 in 1984 and has risen sharply since then to 0.233 as of 
2016.  
Meanwhile, despite improvements in legal rights and education, gender gaps in income and 
employment remain very high and women do the vast majority of unpaid domestic care, which 
reinforces gender gaps in employment and wages and occupational segregation further. In 2014 
women carried out 61.5% of all the hours of unpaid work at the household and 69.3% of the 
unpaid care work (in adult care and child care, laundry, cleaning and housework) in the UK 
(ONS, 2016). The high cost of childcare and elderly care mean that many women have no choice 
but to stay at home and act as unpaid carers for their children or elderly relatives rather than go 
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back to work full time. This contributes substantially to the gender disparity in pay that we see 
between men and women. Despite an improvement since the early 1980s, recent gender pay gap 
reporting shows that men earn, on average, almost 20% more than women. Figure 2 in the 
Appendix  presents the ratio of the hourly wage rate of men to that of women and the share of 
women in hours worked in health, social care, education and child care (henceforth, the social 
sector) and the rest of the economy in the UK. As of 2015 the hourly wage rate of men/women in 
the social sector and the rest of the economy are still as high as 1.313 and 1.230 respectively 
(own calculations based on EUKLEMS data). Women still constitute the vast majority of 
employment in the social sector with a ratio of 0.752 in 2015. Hence, the gender composition of 
hours of paid care work is similar to the composition of unpaid care work. The share of women 
in hours worked in the rest of the economy is still as low as 0.406 (own calculations based on 
EUKLEMS data).  
There is a growing recognition that inequality is both economically and socially destabilizing. 
Furthermore, the UK’s productivity lags behind other European countries, and is still well below 
2008 recession levels. Our results suggest that inequalities, weak public social infrastructure and 
low productivity are linked, and that gender equality, higher wages, lower wealth concentration 
and investing in care and green economy are key to addressing the problems social, economic 
and ecological sustainability.   
We develop a novel macroeconomic model to analyse the effects of multiple dimensions of 
inequalities and fiscal policies on macroeconomic outcomes, integrating i) the impact of three 
dimensions of inequalities –functional income distribution between wages and profits, gender 
inequality, and wealth concentration, and their interactions; ii) the impact of fiscal policies, 
particularly the effects of government spending in social vs. physical infrastructure, and different 
types of taxation; iii) both the demand and supply-side effects; iv) effects on both output and 
employment measured by hours of work of women and men. We build a three sector gendered 
model with social sector (health, social care, education, child care), the rest of the market 
economy, and unpaid care sectors and three types of factors of production -male and female 
labour, and capital. On the demand side, we model behavioural equations determining 
consumption, private investment, exports, imports and government spending. On the supply side, 
productivity changes in the medium-run as an outcome of changes in wages, public and private 
expenditure. Hours of employment in the social sector and the rest of the economy are 
determined by output and labour productivity in the relevant sectors, and social norms about 
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occupational segregation determines hours of employment of women and men in both sectors. 
Wealth concentration depends on functional income distribution and wealth tax. We estimate this 
model econometrically for the UK using time series data for the period of 1970-2016. For the 
medium-run estimation of productivity we use panel data of 18 industries for the period of 1970-
2015. 
The next section analyses the effects of labour market policies and public spending and taxes. 
The final section concludes with policy implications.  
2. The effects of labour market policies, purple and green public infrastructure 
investment and taxation   
We use the empirical estimation results to analyse the effects of changes in wages, gender pay 
gap, different types of public spending, and taxes. Different types of inequalities interact, in 
particular i) changes in wages affect functional income distribution between wage and profit 
income, and ii) changes in the share of profit (after-tax) in national income as well as wealth tax 
affect wealth concentration. In each case we analyse the case where the increase in the wage rate, 
public spending/GDP or tax rates take place in the first period (the short-run), and then the 
relevant variables stay constant in the next period in order to compare the effects in the short and 
medium-run. 
Table 1 in the Appendix shows the total effects of changes in wages and gender pay gap on 
the components of aggregate demand (consumption in social services and the rest of the 
economy, private investment, exports, imports, government investment in social and physical 
infrastructure and government current spending, all as a ratio to GDP), GDP, hours of 
employment (total as well as of women and men) and public debt as a ratio to GDP. The effects 
are after considering the multiplier effects of any initial change on demand. The medium-run 
(MR) is defined as the cumulative of the effects in the short-run (SR) and the next period when 
productivity in the rest of the economy (N) changes endogenously.  
Scenario (A) presents the effects of a 1% increase in both female and male hourly (real) wage 
rate in N; scenario (B) presents the effects of a 1% increase in only female wages in N with 
constant male wages; i.e. closing the gender pay gap in N by 1% (1% decline in   ). In both 
cases, taking into account both demand and productivity effects, all components of demand 
except exports increase both in the short and the medium-run. Exports decrease as an increase in 
wages in N lead to a decline in the profit share. Private investment increases despite a decline in 
profitability due to demand effects. The multiplier is 2.234. In scenario (A), GDP increases by 
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0.244% in the short-run and by 0.146% in the medium-run; hence the economy is wage-led, 
although the effect is economically small. The increase in GDP the medium-run in all scenarios 
is smaller as in the next period the increase in productivity in N leads to a decline in employment 
in N and therefore offsets some of the demand effects.  
In scenario (B), GDP increases by 0.062% in the short-run and by 0.027% in the medium-run; 
hence the economy is gender equality-led, but the effects are even smaller than in the case when 
both wages increase.  
Hours of employment of both men and women increase in the short-run in both scenarios (A) 
and (B), but decrease in the medium-run (by 0.556% in (A) and 0.105% in (B)) as the 
productivity increase in N in the medium-run (0.812% in (A) and 0.153% in (B)) is stronger than 
the increase in GDP.  
Scenario (C) presents the effects of a 1% increase in both female and male wages in the social 
sector (health, social care, education and child care, H
1
) and scenario (D) presents the effects of a 
1% increase in only female wages in H with constant male wages; i.e. closing the gender pay gap 
in H by 1% (1% decline in   ). Demand increases again with both higher wages and gender 
equality both in the short and the medium-run. Compared to the effects of increasing wages in N, 
the total effects on GDP are higher for a variety of reasons: The increase in consumption in H is 
higher because a rise in wages in H have a more substantial effect on the female wage bill and 
the marginal propensity to consume in H out of the female wage income is higher compared to 
the male wage income. The increase in private investment is higher because a rise in wages in H 
does not squeeze private profits. For this reason, the rise in imports in the short run is smaller and 
exports do not fall in the short run and increase in the medium-run, as a rise in productivity in N 
by 0.433% increases the profit share. The multiplier is 2.245. In scenario (C) GDP increases by 
0.427% in the short-run and by 0.333% in the medium-run, and in Scenario (D) GDP increases 
by 0.298% in the short-run and by 0.232% in the medium-run. In both scenarios, employment of 
women increases not only in the short-run but also in the medium-run albeit by a small amount 
(0.022% and 0.012% respectively), but the employment of men increase only in the short-run 
and decreases slightly in the medium-run due to productivity gains in the rest of the economy (by 
0.071% and 0.054% respectively). 
                                                          
1
 The increase in hourly real wage rate in N and H in GBP is comparable. A 1% increase in female wages in H and 
N are £0.18 and £0.17 respectively, and a 1% increase in male wages in H and N are £0.24 and £0.21 respectively in 
2015.   
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Finally, scenario (E) presents the effects of a 1% increase in female and male wages in both N 
and H, which is the sum of the effects in scenarios (A) and (C),  and (F) presents and upward 
convergence scenario of closing the gender pay gaps with female wages increasing faster than 
male wages, i.e. a 2% increase in female wages and 1% increase in male wages in both N and H, 
which is the sum of the effects in simulations (A), (B), (C) and (D). An example of the latter 
scenario would be to increase average wages via an increase in the minimum wage or collective 
bargaining coverage while at the same time enforcing equal pay legislation and aiming at higher 
rates of increases in occupations at the bottom end of the pay scale, where women constitute a 
large share of the workforce. In the upward convergence scenario, GDP increases by 1.030% in 
the short-run and by 0.736% in the medium-run, but despite an increase in employment of both 
women and men in the short run, employment decreases in the medium-run for both (by 0.528% 
for women and 0.865% for men). Total employment, as well as employment of both men and 
women, are wage-led and gender equality-led in the short-run but not in the medium-run when 
wages increase in both sectors.   
Along with the increase in GDP, public debt as a ratio to GDP decreases in all scenarios, 
including in (C)-(F), all of which include a direct increase in public social infrastructure 
spending via higher wage rates in H; e.g. in (F) public debt/GDP decreases by 0.354%-points in 
the short-run and 0.327%-points in the medium-run. 
Table 2 in the Appendix shows the total (post-multiplier) effects of fiscal policies. Scenario 
(A) presents the effects of a 1%-point increase in public social infrastructure investment as a 
ratio to GDP (  ), i.e. higher hours of employment in H (e.g. more teachers, nurses, social care 
workers) with a constant wage rate in H. Following Ilkkaracan (2013), who coined the term 
“purple” economy for public social infrastructure to chime with the green economy, we label this 
policy as purple public social infrastructure investment. Scenario (B) presents the effects of a 
1%-point increase in public physical infrastructure investment/GDP (  ). To indicate the priority 
of investment in renewable energy, public transport, and housing insulation we label this 
investment as green public investment. In both cases, all components of demand increase, and 
the increase in the medium-run is slightly smaller due to the increase in productivity.  
A 1%-point increase in public investment in social infrastructure increases productivity 
(output per hour) in the rest of the economy by 3.3% percent in the medium run. The high effect 
of public spending in education, childcare, health and social care on productivity in the rest of 
the economy provides supporting evidence that this spending serves the purpose of infrastructure 
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investment.  The increase in productivity is substantially higher in the case of higher social 
infrastructure investment (3.272%) compared to the case of higher physical infrastructure 
investment (0.510%). This is mostly due to the strong direct positive impact of social 
infrastructure on productivity as well as the higher rate of increase in household consumption in 
H, as more jobs are created for women in scenario (A) in H, which predominantly hires women. 
In the case of higher social infrastructure spending, GDP increases more (3.585% in the short-
run and 2.707% in the medium-run) than the case of physical infrastructure investment (2.046% 
in the short-run and 1.999% in the medium-run) not only in the short-run but also the medium-
run. The GDP and employment impact are substantially higher than the effects of increasing 
wages by 1% in Table 1. Despite productivity increases, employment increases not only in the 
short-run but also the medium-run for both men and women in both scenarios. However, the 
increase in women’s employment is much stronger compared to men in the case of social 
infrastructure investment due to occupational segregation and concentration of women in the 
social sector. Women’s employment increases by 6.722% in the short-run and 3.238% in the 
medium-run while men’s employment increases by 4.437% in the short-run and only 0.420% in 
the medium-run in the case of public purple social infrastructure investment, whereas in the case 
of public physical infrastructure investment employment of both men and women increase at a 
rather similar rate (2.210% for women and 2.109% for men in the short-run and 1.764% for 
women and 1.576% for men in the medium-run).   
In both scenarios, public debt/GDP decreases in the short-run (by 0.981%-point in (A) and 
0.213%-point in (B)) but increases marginally in the medium-run (by 0.497%-point in (A) and 
0.550%-point in (B)). But even in the medium-run, increasing public spending funds about half 
of itself by generating higher output and tax revenues. It is also worth emphasizing that private 
investment increases overall, despite the partial negative effect of higher government borrowing 
thanks to the positive demand and productivity effects. 
Scenario (C), (D) and (E) in Table 2 present the effects of a 1%-point increase in the implicit 
tax rate on capital income, wealth and labour income respectively. Increasing taxes on both 
capital and labour income lead to a decline in all components of demand and overall GDP, 
productivity in N as well as employment for both men and women in both the short and the 
medium-run. However, the negative effects on demand are much larger in the case of taxes on 
labour, even in the case of private investment, owing to a stronger negative effect on demand and 
productivity in N, and thereby public debt/GDP increases in the medium-run despite a rise in the 
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tax rate. In contrast, a 1%-point increase in the implicit tax rate on wealth has positive and very 
large effects on both GDP and employment of men and women; however, we have to emphasize 
that a 1%-point increase in the implicit tax rate on wealth is almost doubling the current rate, 
which stands at 0.989% in 2016 taking it back to its peak in 1970; hence an economically much 
more substantial increase than the 1%-point increase in the implicit tax rate on capital income. 
The most important effect of increasing wealth tax by 1%-point is the fall in wealth 
concentration (the ratio of the net private wealth of the top 1% to total net private wealth) by 
0.876%-point, which in turn decreases the net private wealth of the top 1%  and increases the net 
private wealth of the bottom 99% in both the short and the medium-run. Both of these 
developments lead to a significant increase in private investment due to the positive effect of the 
increase in the wealth of the bottom 99% and the fall in the wealth of the top 1% as well as 
higher consumption due to higher marginal propensity to consume in N out of the wealth of the 
bottom 99% .  As a consequence, GDP increases by 0.902% in the short-run and 4.285% in the 
medium-run; total employment increases by 0.949% in the short-run and 4.134% in the medium-
run with comparable effects for both men and women. Public debt/GDP falls by 4.264%-point in 
the short-run and 10.268%-point in the medium-run 
Finally, in Table 3 in the Appendix we present the impact of policy mixes. Scenario (A) 
shows the effects of a 1%-point increase in purple public social infrastructure investment/GDP 
and closing the gender gaps via an upward convergence with a 2% increase in female wages and 
a 1% increase in male wages in both N and H. This sums up the effects in scenarios (A) in Table 
2 and (F) in Table 1. GDP increases substantially in both the short-run (4.615%) and the 
medium-run (3.443%). Employment of women increases both in the short-run and the medium-
run (7.835% and 2.710% respectively); however, employment of men increases only in the short-
run (5.500%) but decrease in the medium-run (0.445%) due to productivity gains in N, where 
most male employment is generated. Public debt/GDP decreases (by 1.543%-point in the short-
run and 0.010%-point in the medium-run) when fiscal expansion takes the form of both hiring 
more people and paying them a higher hourly wage rate in H combined with increasing wages 
and gender equality in also the rest of the economy. 
Scenario (B) in Table 3 adds to (A) also a 1%-point increase in public green physical 
infrastructure investment/GDP (  ). Hence, scenario (B) is the case of purple and green public 
investment and upward convergence in wages, summing up the effects in scenarios (A) and (B) 
in Table 2 and (F) in Table 1. The effects on GDP are even stronger than in policy mix (A) and 
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employment of both men and women increase both in the short (7.609% and 10.044%) and the 
medium-run (1.132% and 4.475%).  
To summarize, the effects of higher wages and gender equality on GDP are positive in both 
the short and the medium-run, albeit small; however, the effect of higher wages and gender 
equality on productivity is much stronger in the medium-run and therefore the impact on 
employment is negative. Hence, achieving both higher wages and gender equality and 
employment for both men and women requires a stimulus to demand in the form of higher public 
spending in both H and N. However, in this scenario, while public debt/GDP decreases in the 
short-run (1.756%-point), it increases marginally in the medium-run (0.540%-point).  
Scenario (C) in Table 3 presents a policy of progressive income taxation, i.e. increasing tax 
rates on capital income and decreasing tax rates on labour income by 1%-point, which is 
equivalent to the effects in simulations (C) minus (E) in Table 2. This leads to higher GDP, 
private investment, and employment for both men and women and lower public debt/GDP in 
both the short and the medium-run. In the medium-run, GDP increases by 1.129%, women’s 
employment increases by 0.840%, men’s employment increases by 0.698% and public debt/GDP 
decreases by 0.531%-point. 
Finally, scenario (D) in Table 3 presents a policy mix of purple and green public investment,  
upward convergence in wages, and progressive income and wealth taxation via a 1%-point 
increase in public social and physical infrastructure investment/GDP (   and   ) and closing the 
gender gaps via upward convergence in wages with a 2% increase in female wages and a 1% 
increase in male wages in both N and H, a 1%-point increase in the tax rate on profit income 
(  ),  a 1%-point decrease in the tax rate on wages (  ) and a 1%-point increase in the tax rate 
on wealth (   ), which is equivalent to the effects in simulations (A) plus (B) plus (C) plus (D) 
minus (E) in Table 2 plus  (F) in Table 1. In the medium-run, GDP increases by 10.856%, 
women’s employment increases by 9.607%, men’s employment increases by 5.836%, and public 
debt/GDP decreases by 10.259%-point. The results indicate that taxation of wealth is a 
particularly effective policy to fund purple and green public investment; e.g. inheritance tax may 
be a suitable tool for funding long term elderly care. 
3. Further policy implications 
The high effect of public spending in education, childcare, health and social care on 
productivity in the rest of the economy provide evidence that this spending functions as 
infrastructure investment. Our analysis challenges conventional thinking about the categorization 
10 
 
of public spending in health and social care, education and child care in national accounts. Day 
to day spending in these sectors, e.g. wages of teachers, nurses or social care workers, is 
considered as current spending, thus not as investment, in our national accounts; however public 
spending in these social sectors has long term benefits to the society as a whole, with substantial 
productivity impact in all other sectors of the economy by increasing the skills, health and 
innovative capacity of people (Elson, 2016, 2017; Women’s Budget Group, 2015). Improving 
the quality of childcare and early years education would develop the cognitive and creative 
capacity of our children, increasing their future productivity.  Crucially, they improve gender 
equality, and reverse one of the most persistent dimensions of inequality in our societies, as they 
provide crucial services which are otherwise provided by the unpaid invisible domestic labour of 
women. Public supply of these services helps women to participate in social and economic life 
more equally. This in turn further increases productivity by unleashing the hidden potential of 
women. Moreover, in the current gendered occupationally segregated labour markets, these 
sectors employ predominantly women, and more social public spending helps closing the gender 
gap in employment. Women spend a higher proportion of their income on things that benefit the 
wellbeing of their children, such as health, education and healthy nutrition, so as women earn 
more, the positive effect on long-term productivity would be compounded.   
Recognizing the vast amount and importance of the time women spend on unpaid care at 
the household, which is not accounted for in the standard national accounts and measures such as 
GDP, is crucial for designing policies to increase gender equality. A fiscal policy stance, which 
aims to publicly provide the necessary social services, would radically decrease the amount of 
unpaid domestic care. E.g. universal free child care and nurseries open for sufficiently long hours 
benefit mothers and fathers by giving them an equal chance to balance work and life, and also 
benefit the society by decreasing inequality between children from different backgrounds, and 
improving the creative capacity of children.  Needless to say there will always be the need and 
desire for care provided by family members for children or the elderly in the domestic private 
sphere; regulations such as parental leave for both mothers and fathers, and working time 
arrangements that facilitate combining care and work for both men and women should ensure 
that time for caring can be equally shared between men and women.   
Progressive taxation, which improves after tax equality in terms of income, wealth and 
gender, is also important in the context of public spending on non-means-tested services such as 
universal health and social care, education and child care. A higher tax rate on higher incomes is 
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a way for those who can afford to contribute more towards universally provided public services. 
The results further indicate that taxation of wealth is a particularly effective policy to fund purple 
and green public investment; e.g. inheritance tax may be a suitable tool for funding long term 
elderly care. 
In this paper, we analysed the effect of the various labour market and fiscal policies on hours 
of employment of women and men; however, we did not analyse the changes in working time 
regulations. A change in labour market regulation leading to a shortening of the working week, 
where a given number of hours of employment can be shared among a higher number of 
employees is a further step for equitable sustainable development. A scenario of upward 
convergence in hourly wage rates along with a downward convergence in weekly working hours 
between men and women, i.e. men working shorter hours than the current circumstances, while 
more women increasing their hours of work, is expected to reduce both gender pay and 
employment gaps. Higher hourly wage rates may make a reduction in weekly working hours 
appealing for the current full-time employees, and the provision of high quality public social care 
infrastructure may make higher hours of work appealing for the current part-time workers, who 
are predominantly women.  
Changes in employment patterns and gender gaps can have further crucial effects on gender 
norms, which can further transform occupational and sectoral gender segregation. 
There is also an important complimentarity between gender equality, shorter working hours 
and green development (Onaran, 2016; İlkkaracan, 2013).  A larger proportion of the society’s 
time spent caring for each other is also a greener alternative, whether that is in paid or unpaid 
time, as these activities are much lower in terms of their carbon intensity. Furthermore social 
infrastructure services are very labour-intensive and therefore public investment in this area is a 
vehicle for generating more employment for a given rate of growth in national output —a target 
more consistent with low carbon emissions.   
These findings hint at policy insights to address some urgent destabilizing economic and 
social issues in the UK and the world such as stagnation in productivity, unemployment, 
unhealthy growth driven by private debt or demographic and care crisis. An appropriate mix of 
the labour market and fiscal policies may help to tackle the multiple dimensions of inequalities 
with an aim to achieve a sustainable economy, environment and society.  
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Appendix 
Figure 1: The share of wages in GDP (adjusted, at factor cost) and wealth concentration 
(share of top 1% in total net wealth) in the UK 
 
Source: AMECO for wage share and WIID for wealth concentration, based on Onaran et al. 2019. 
 
Figure 2: The ratio of hourly wage rate of men/women (α) and share of women in hours 
worked (β) in the social sector (H) and the rest of the economy (N) in the UK 
 
Source: Own calculations based on EU KLEMS database. Based on Onaran et al. 2019. 
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Table 1: The total (post-multiplier) effects of changes in wages and gender pay gap on the components of aggregate demand (as a ratio to GDP), GDP, 
employment (hours) and public debt/GDP 
 
Notes: Based on Onaran et al. 2019. (i) Column (9)=(1)+(2)+(3)+(4)-(5)+(6)+(7)+(8). In each column, the effects are multiplied by the wage rate in the relevant sector and divided by Y.   
(ii) SR: short run. MR: medium-run, defined as the cumulative of the effects in the short-run and the next period when productivity changes.  
(iii) Sum of the effects in simulations (A) and (C) 
(iv) Sum of the effects in simulations (A), (B), (C) and (D) 
 
 
%-point change 
in consumption 
in N /GDP
%-point change 
in consumption 
in H /GDP
%-point change 
in private 
investment 
/GDP
%-point change 
in exports /GDP
%-point change 
in imports in N 
/GDP
%-point change 
in public social 
infrastructure 
investment  
/GDP
%-point change 
in government 
current 
expenditure 
/GDP
%-point change 
in public 
physical 
infrastructure 
investment 
/GDP
% Change 
in GDP
% change in 
total 
employment
% change in 
female 
employment
% change in 
male 
employment
%-point change in 
public debt /GDP
ΔCN/Y ΔCH/Y ΔI/Y ΔX/Y ΔM/Y ΔGH/Y ΔGC/Y ΔIG/Y ΔY/Y ΔE/E ΔEF/EF ΔEM/EM ΔD/Y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(i) 
(10) (11) (12) (13)
SR (ii) 0.356 0.013 0.046 -0.045 0.188 0.030 0.025 0.007 0.244 0.257 0.263 0.251 -0.184
MR (ii) 0.133 0.002 0.067 -0.008 0.085 0.018 0.015 0.004 0.146 -0.556 -0.472 -0.623 -0.208
SR 0.091 0.006 0.013 -0.014 0.051 0.007 0.006 0.002 0.062 0.065 0.066 0.063 -0.053
MR 0.048 0.003 0.011 -0.011 0.031 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.027 -0.105 -0.089 -0.118 -0.069
SR 0.215 0.064 0.121 0.000 0.163 0.134 0.043 0.013 0.427 0.449 0.461 0.440 -0.170
MR 0.067 0.057 0.108 0.020 0.086 0.122 0.034 0.010 0.330 -0.030 0.022 -0.071 -0.119
SR 0.148 0.051 0.086 0.000 0.116 0.090 0.030 0.009 0.298 0.314 0.322 0.308 -0.155
MR 0.044 0.046 0.079 0.014 0.063 0.082 0.024 0.007 0.232 -0.024 0.012 -0.054 -0.112
SR 0.571 0.077 0.167 -0.045 0.352 0.163 0.068 0.020 0.670 0.706 0.724 0.691 -0.354
MR 0.200 0.059 0.175 0.011 0.171 0.140 0.049 0.014 0.476 -0.586 -0.451 -0.694 -0.327
SR 0.811 0.133 0.266 -0.059 0.519 0.261 0.105 0.031 1.030 1.085 1.113 1.062 -0.562
MR 0.292 0.108 0.265 0.013 0.265 0.225 0.075 0.022 0.736 -0.715 -0.528 -0.865 -0.507
F. Upward convergence: The effects of a 2%  increase in  female wages and 1%  increase in male wages in both N and H (closing gender pay gaps by 1% ; 1%  decline in α H iand αN (iv))
A. The effects of a 1%  increase in female and male wages in N
B.  Closing gender pay gap in N by 1% : the effects of a 1%  increase in only female wages in N (1%  decline in αN)
C. The effects of a 1%  increase in female and male wages in H
D.  Closing gender pay gap in H by 1% : the effects of a 1%  increase in only female wages in H (1%  decline in αH)
E: The effects of a 1%  increase in  female and male wages in both N and H (iii) 
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Table 2: The total (post-multiplier) effects of changes in fiscal policies on the components of aggregate demand (as a ratio to GDP), GDP, employment (hours) 
and public debt/GDP 
 
Notes: Based on Onaran et al. 2019.  (i) Column (9)=(1)+(2)+(3)+(4)-(5)+(6)+(7)+(8). In each column, the marginal effects are divided by Y.   
(ii) SR: short run. MR: medium-run, defined as the cumulative of the effects in the short-run and the next period when productivity in N changes endogenously.  
 
%-point change 
in consumption 
in N /GDP
%-point change 
in consumption 
in H /GDP
%-point change 
in private 
investment 
/GDP
%-point change 
in exports /GDP
%-point change 
in imports in N 
/GDP
%-point change 
in public social 
infrastructure 
investment  
/GDP
%-point change 
in government 
current 
expenditure 
/GDP
%-point change 
in public 
physical 
infrastructure 
investment 
/GDP
% Change 
in GDP
% change in 
total 
employment
% change in 
female 
employment
% change in 
male 
employment
%-point change in 
public debt /GDP
ΔCN/Y ΔCH/Y ΔI/Y ΔX/Y ΔM/Y ΔGH/Y ΔGC/Y ΔIG/Y ΔY/Y ΔE/E ΔEF/EF ΔEM/EM ΔD/Y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(i) 
(10) (11) (12) (13)
SR (ii) 1.847 0.071 0.960 0.000 1.200 1.435 0.365 0.107 3.585 5.454 6.722 4.437 -0.981
MR (ii) 0.649 0.018 0.753 0.148 0.545 1.328 0.276 0.081 2.707 1.674 3.238 0.420 0.497
SR 0.985 0.034 0.512 0.000 1.003 0.249 0.208 1.061 2.046 2.154 2.210 2.109 -0.213
MR 0.916 0.027 0.472 0.023 0.945 0.243 0.204 1.060 1.999 1.660 1.764 1.576 0.550
SR -0.194 -0.006 -0.057 0.000 -0.102 -0.025 -0.021 -0.006 -0.208 -0.219 -0.224 -0.214 -0.200
MR -0.230 -0.005 -0.009 -0.005 -0.094 -0.025 -0.021 -0.006 -0.207 -0.127 -0.143 -0.114 -0.478
SR 0.298 0.015 0.802 0.000 0.442 0.110 0.092 0.027 0.902 0.949 0.974 0.930 -4.264
MR 1.986 0.066 3.199 0.020 2.070 0.521 0.436 0.128 4.285 4.134 4.293 4.006 -10.268
SR -1.080 -0.038 -0.321 0.000 -0.570 -0.142 -0.119 -0.035 -1.164 -1.226 -1.257 -1.200 0.212
MR -1.156 -0.034 -0.394 -0.027 -0.614 -0.162 -0.136 -0.040 -1.335 -0.888 -0.983 -0.812 0.053
A. The effects of a 1% -point increase in public purple social infrastructure investment/GDP (κH)
B. The effects of a 1% -point increase in public green physical infrastructure investment/GDP (κG)
C. The effects of a 1% -point increase in the tax rate on profit income (t
R
)
D. The effects of a 1% -point increase in the tax rate on wealth (t
PW
)
E. The effects of a 1% -point increase in the tax rate on wage income (t
W
)
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Table 3: The total (post-multiplier) effects of mix of labour market and fiscal policies on the components of aggregate demand (as a ratio to GDP), GDP, 
employment (hours) and public debt/GDP 
 
Notes: Based on Onaran et al. 2019.  (i) Column (9)=(1)+(2)+(3)+(4)-(5)+(6)+(7)+(8)  
(ii) Sum of the effects in simulations (A) in Table 2 and (F) in Table 1. 
(iii) Sum of the effects in simulations (A) and (B) in Table 2 and (F) in Table 1. 
(iv) The effects in simulations (C) minus (E) in Table 2. 
(v) The effects in simulations (A) plus (B) plus (C) plus (D) minus (E) in Table 2 plus  (F) in Table 1. 
%-point change 
in consumption 
in N /GDP
%-point change 
in consumption 
in H /GDP
%-point change 
in private 
investment 
/GDP
%-point change 
in exports /GDP
%-point change 
in imports in N 
/GDP
%-point change 
in public social 
infrastructure 
investment  
/GDP
%-point change 
in government 
current 
expenditure 
/GDP
%-point change 
in public 
physical 
infrastructure 
investment 
/GDP
% Change 
in GDP
% change in 
total 
employment
% change in 
female 
employment
% change in 
male 
employment
%-point change in 
public debt /GDP
ΔCN/Y ΔCH/Y ΔI/Y ΔX/Y ΔM/Y ΔGH/Y ΔGC/Y ΔIG/Y ΔY/Y ΔE/E ΔEF/EF ΔEM/EM ΔD/Y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(i) 
(10) (11) (12) (13)
SR 2.658 0.205 1.226 -0.059 1.719 1.696 0.470 0.138 4.615 6.539 7.835 5.500 -1.543
MR 0.941 0.126 1.018 0.161 0.809 1.554 0.351 0.103 3.443 0.959 2.710 -0.445 -0.010
SR 3.643 0.239 1.738 -0.059 2.722 1.945 0.678 1.199 6.661 8.693 10.044 7.609 -1.756
MR 1.856 0.153 1.490 0.184 1.754 1.797 0.554 1.163 5.443 2.619 4.475 1.132 0.540
SR 0.887 0.032 0.264 0.000 0.469 0.116 0.097 0.029 0.956 1.007 1.033 0.986 -0.412
MR 0.926 0.029 0.385 0.022 0.519 0.137 0.115 0.034 1.129 0.761 0.840 0.698 -0.531
SR 4.827 0.286 2.804 -0.059 3.632 2.171 0.867 1.255 8.519 10.649 12.051 9.525 -6.431
MR 4.767 0.248 5.074 0.226 4.344 2.455 1.105 1.325 10.856 7.514 9.607 5.836 -10.259
B. Purple and green public investment and upward convergence in wages: The effects of a 1% -point increase in public social and physical infrastructure investment/GDP (κ H and κG) and closing gender gaps via 
upward convergence in wages via 2%  increase in  female wages and 1%  increase in male wages in both N and H (iii)
C. Progressive income tax: The effects of a 1% -point increase in the tax rate on profit income (t
R
) and a 1% -point decrease in the tax rate on wages (t
W
) (iv)
D. Purple and green public investment,  upward convergence in wages, and progressive income and wealth taxation: a 1% -point increase in public social and physical infrastructure investment/GDP (κ H and κG) and 
closing gender gaps via upward convergence in wages via 2%  increase in  female wages and 1%  increase in male wages in both N and H a 1% -point increase in the tax rate on profit income (t
R
),  a 1% -point 
decrease in the tax rate on wages (t
W
) and a 1% -point increase in the tax rate on wealth (t
PW
)(v)
A. Purple public investment and upward convergence in wages: The effects of a 1% -point increase in public social infrastructure investment/GDP (κ H) and closing gender gaps via upward convergence in wages via 
2%  increase in  female wages and 1%  increase in male wages in both N and H (ii)
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